Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2008

State of Utah v. Henry Louis Jackson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lori J. Seppi; Salt Lake Legal Defender\'s Association; Counsel for Appellant.
Ryan D. Tenney; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General; Michaela
Andruzzi; Salt Lake County District Attorney\'s Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Jackson, No. 20080418 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/917

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Case No. 20080418-CA
IN THE
UTAH COURT O F APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Henry Louis Jackson,
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellee
Appeal from convictions for two counts of attempted criminal homicide, one
count of assault, and one count of cruelty to an animal, in the Third Judicial
District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Randall Skanchy
presiding.
D. T E N N E Y (9866)
Assistant Attorney General
M A R K L . SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
RYAN

L O R I J . SEPPI

Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

MlCHAELA ANDRUZZI
Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee
Oral Argument Requested

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

JUL 2 3 2009

Case No. 20080418-CA
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Henry Louis Jackson,
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief- )f Appellee
Appeal from convictions for two counts of attempted criminal homicide, one
count of assault, and one count of cruelty to an animal, in the Third Judicial
District Court of Utah, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Randall Skanchy
presiding.
D. T E N N E Y (9866)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
RYAN

LORIJ. SEPPI
Salt Lake Legal Defender's Association
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

MlCHAELA ANDRUZZI
Salt Lake County District
Attorney's Office

Counsel for Appellant

Counsel for Appellee
Oral Argument Requested

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS

3

DEFENDANT CONFRONTS KATHY AFTER SEEING HER WITH
ANOTHER MAN

4

DEFENDANT IS CHARGED

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

12

ARGUMENT

16

I.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT ADMITTED KATHY
CAPELLAN'S STATEMENTS TO OFFICER WARE

16

A. Kathy's statements to Officer Ware were excited utterances

16

1. Contrary to Defendant's claim, Kathy's statements were made while she
was under the stress of Defendant's violent attack

16

2. Kathy's statements were utterances for purposes of the excited utterance
rule

18

B. Even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these statements, die
error was harmless

21

II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT ADMITTED KATHY'S
STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE WINTERS
A. Defendant's Bujan argument is inadequately briefed

23
23

B. Even if adequately briefed, this argument should still be rejected

24

C. In any event, even if the trial court did err in admitting these statements, the
error was harmless

27

i

III. THE TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
UNTIMELY BATSON OBJECTION
A. Defendant's Batson objection was untimely
B. Even if addressed on the merits, this Court should reject Defendant's Batson
challenge
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
ADMITTED PHOTOGRAPHS OF CAMERON'S WOUNDS

28
29

31

37

A. These photographs did not violate rule 403

37

B. Even if these photographs violated rule 403, the error was harmless

43

V. THE TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
REOPENING THE CASE TO ALLOW THE STATE TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE

44

VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

47

VII.THE TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
ORDERED DEFENDANT TO SERVE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES

53

CONCLUSION

54

A D D E N D U M A - Rule
Rule
Rule
Rule

403, Utah Rules of Evidence
801, Utah Rules of Evidence
803, Utah Rules of Evidence
16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES

Batson v, Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)

29, 31

Hernande^v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991)

31

Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 1997)
Lockett v. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2000)
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988)

33
33, 35
47

Purkettv. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995)

31, 32, 36

Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995)

23, 24

United States v. Harris, 197 F.3d 870 (7th Cir. 1999)
United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 2007)
United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1992)
United States v. Thompson, 450 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2006)
United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007)

34
33, 35
33, 35, 36
33, 35
34

STATE CASES

A.K.&&

Whipple Plumbing <& Heating v. Aspen Constr.,

1999 UT App 87, 977 P.2d 518

45

Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56,194 P.3d 903

24

Bang v. State, 620 So.2d 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)

34

Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
Davis v. Riley, 437 P.2d 453 (Utah 1968)

40
46

Dean v. State, 746 So.2d 891 (Miss. App. 1998)
Jones v. State, 548 S.E.2d 75 (Ga. App. 2001)

40
34

Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496 (Utah 1976)

45, 46
iii

Medelv. Statet 2008 UT 32,184 P.3d 1226

47

Nobles v. State, 411 S.E.2d 294 (Ga. App. 1991)

40

People v. Falkenstein, 288 A.D.2d 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)

34

People v. Fierer, 529 N.E. 2d 972 (111. 1988)

40

State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1990)

44

State v. Barber, 2009 UT App 91, ~P.3d~

42

State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1998)
State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, 52 P.3d 1210

41, 42
2, 38

State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153 (Utah App. 1997)

33, 34, 36, 37

State v. Bruno, 256 P. 109 (Utah 1927)

44

State v. Bujan, 2008 UT 47,190 P.3d 1255

23

State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, 55 P.3d 573

21

State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, 57 P.3d 220

38, 43

State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, 41 P.3d 1153

33

State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517 (Utah 1989)

33

State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, 58 P.3d 867

31

State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, 994 P.2d 177

33, 34

State v. Cottrell, 910 S.W.2d 814 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995)

40

State v. Cravens, 1999 UT App 156U

44

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837

42

State v. DiBello, 780 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1989)

38, 43

State v. Floret 111 P.2d 452 (Utah 1989)

42

State v. Garner, 2008 UT App 32,177 P.3d 637

25

State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, 106 P.3d 734

42
iv

State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (Utah 1953)

44

State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, 40 P.3d 626

53

State v. Hernandez 2008 UT App 342U

,.

State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545 (Utah 1996)
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346

44
31, 32
25

State v. Kaytso, 684 P.2d 63 (Utah 1984)

17, 20

State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600 (Utah 1951)

45, 46, 47

State v. Undgren, 910 P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1996)

41

State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989)

40

State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401 (Utah App. 1996)

36

State v. Middleton, 611 P.2d 698 (Or. App. 1980)

40

State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48,122 P.3d 571

45

State v. Montoya, 910 P.2d 441 (Utah App. 1996)

47

State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah App. 1993)

36

State v. Pirela, 2003 UT App 39, 65 P.3d 307

44

State v. Rangel, 866 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1993)

25

State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517,153 P.3d 830
State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53,190 P.3d 1259

2, 22, 28
2, 29

State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT App 472, 200 P.3d 670
State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, 989 P.2d 503
State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995)

.passim
29
passim

State P. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989)

19, 20, 22, 28

State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT49, 162 P.3d 1106
State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989)

passim
44

v

State v. Valde^ 2006 UT 39,140 P.3d 1219

29, 30

State v. Valde^ 2008 UT App 329,194 P.3d 195
State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, 20 P.3d 271

3, 53, 54
41, 42

State v. Yane^ 2002 UT App 50 42 P.3d 1248

3

Troncoso v. State, 2004 WL 573659 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)

40

Tuftv. Brotherson, 150 P.2d 384 (Utah 1944)

2, 45

West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App 188,14, 5 P.3d 1

19, 20

STATE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-402 (West 2004)

52, 53

Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401 (West 2004)

53, 54

Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-202 (West 2004)

10, 39, 44

Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-502 (West 2004)

26

Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-506 (West 2004)

26

Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103 (West 2008)

1

FEDERAL RULES

2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 (6th ed. 2006)

17,19

5 C.]S. Appeal and Error §906

45
STATE RULES

Utah R. Evid. 803(2)

16

VI

Case No. 20080418-CA
IN THE
UTAH COURT O F APPEALS

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Henry Louis Jackson,
Defendant/Appellant.
Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals convictions for two counts of attempted aggravated murder, one
count of assault, and one count of cruelty to an animal. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Were Kathy Capellan's statements to Officer Ware admissible as excited utterances,
where the statements were made moments after Defendant had hit her with his car twice,
stabbed her son four times, and stabbed her son's dog in the throat?
2.

Were Kathy's statements to Detective Winters admissible as prior consistent

statements, when they were introduced at trial to rebut Defendant's claim that Kathy had
fabricated her story?
Standard of Review for Issues 1 & 2. When reviewing a hearsay ruling, the court's legal
conclusions are reviewed for correctness, the court's factual findings are reviewed for clear error,

and the court's ultimate ruling on admissibility is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, ^ 10,153 P.3d 830.
3. Did the trial court err when it rejected Defendant's Batson objection, where
Defendant did not obtain a ruling on the objection until after the remaining venire had been
dismissed, and where the stricken potential juror was both young and partially deaf?
Standard ofReview. The question of whether a Batson objection was timely is a question of
law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, \ 6, 190 P.3d 1259. A trial
court's finding that a strike was not motivated by a discriminatory intent "must be sustained
unless it is clearly erroneous." State v. Rosa-Re, 2008 UT App 472, ^ 3, 200 P.3d 670 (quotations
and citation omitted).
4. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it admitted three non-gruesome
photographs of Cameron Hardman's wounds?
Standard of Review. Defendant has not challenged the trial court's conclusion that the
photographs were not gruesome. As such, the court's decision to admit the photographs under
rule 403 is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 47, 52 P.3d 1210.
5. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it reopened the case to allow the
State to present rebuttal evidence regarding a claim that Defendant had raised for the first time
after the close of the evidence?
Standard ofReview. A "motion to reopen a case . . . is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court." Tuft v. Brotherson, 150 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1944).
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6. Did the trial court err when it denied Defendant's motion to dismiss based on the
State's failure to produce his vehicle, where Defendant knew about the vehicle's existence from
the outset, did not request the vehicle until after it had been released to its lienholder, and where
the bloodstains within the vehicle would not have supported Defendant's claim of self-defense?
Standard of Review. 'Whether the State's destruction of potentially exculpatory evidence
violates due process is a question of law that we review for correctness." State v. Tiedemann^ 2007
UT 49,TI12, 162 P.3d 1106.
7. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by ordering Defendant to serve consecutive
sentences, where Defendant violendy attacked Kathy Capellan, Cameron Hardman, and
Cameron's dog, and where Defendant had previously been convicted of killing his former wife?
Standard of Review. A decision to impose consecutive sentences is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Valde^ 2008 UT App 329,14, 194 P.3d 195.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are determinative of this case and are printed in full in Addendum A: Rule
403, Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 801, Utah Rules of Evidence; Rule 803, Utah Rules of
Evidence; Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS1
"I was his girl until I didn't have any breath in my body"
Defendant lived with Kathy Capellan and her son Cameron Hardman for about a month
and a half during the summer of 2006. R. 215: 60-61. When Kathy ended the relationship and
"In setting out the facts from the record on appeal... all conflicts and doubts" are
resolved "cin favor of the jury's verdict and the rulings of the trial court."5 State v. Yane^ 2002
UT App 50, \ 1 n.l, 42 P.3d 1248 (citation omitted).

3

Defendant moved out, Defendant began sitting outside Kathy's apartment at nights, watching
her door. R. 215: 61, 65.
Tifany Herrera lived in the same apartment complex. R. 215: 152. During the fall of
2006, Tifany often saw Defendant parked outside Kathy's apartment late at night. R. 215:154.
At one point, Tifany saw Defendant parked there every night for two weeks straight. R. 215:
155. On one occasion, Defendant adjusted his mirror from side to side to let Tifany know that
"he'd seen me see him." R. 215: 155.
When Kathy finally confronted Defendant, Defendant claimed that "it was his house"
and said that he "wanted to see what was going on in there." R. 215: 65. Kathy thought that
this was "a litde scary." R. 215: 66. According to Kathy, "[h]e used to tell me I was his girl until
I didn't have any breath in my body." R. 215: 85.
Defendant confronts Kathy after seeing her with another man
On November 8,2006, Defendant came over to Kathy's house and got "mad" at Kathy
because he had seen her with another man. R. 215: 62. Defendant said, "Bitch, you are going to
tell me who was in the car with you at Smith's." R. 215: 62-63. Defendant then "poked [her]
real hard in [the] nose with his finger," and said, "[tjonight it's going to come to an end, Kathy.
You're going to tell me who it was." R. 215: 63. When Kathy's son Cameron tried intervening,
Defendant ran out of the apartment and got into his car. R. 215: 22-23, 63, 66. When Cameron
followed him, Defendant tried to run him over. R. 215: 22-24.
"Today is going to be the end of it"
The following day, Kathy and Cameron came home at about noon after getting some
lunch. R. 215: 26-27. Kathy saw Defendant's car sitting at the entrance to her apartment
4

complex, and it scared her. R. 215: 71-72. When Kathy got out of her car, Defendant drove
forward and hit her, running over her ankle. R. 215: 27-28, 73. Defendant then backed up,
drove over Kathy's foot, and "turned around to get even with the sidewalk that [Kathy] was
laying on." R. 215: 73. Kathy and Cameron both thought that Defendant was trying to get into
position to hit Kathy again. R. 215: 74.
A number of neighbors heard this attack through their apartment windows. Cindy
Young, a resident of one of the nearby apartments, was sitting in her ground level apartment
that morning when she heard "a big roar" and the sound of people "running." R. 214: 88-89.
Pamela Lomax was visiting her niece, Tifany Herrera, when the attack occurred. R. 214: 38-39.
Sometime around noon, Pamela and Tifany both heard a loud noise outside the window; Pamela
described it as "a big crash," while Tifany described it as a "big bang." R. 214: 41; 215: 156.
Pamela thought that someone had hit her car, so she and Tifany ran to the front door and
looked outside. R. 214: 42. Tifany saw Kathy outside "laying on the ground," with Defendant
in his car facing her. R. 215: 157.
At this point, Cameron ran over to Kathy, handed her his dog, Tyson, and approached
Defendant's car to confront him. R. 215: 75. Cameron pulled open the car door and tried to hit
Defendant, but he only landed one partial blow. R. 215: 49-50. Cameron later explained that he
"was trying to protect [his] mother." R. 215: 49.
Defendant reached over to the seat and pulled out a "big steak kni[fe]." R. 215: 29-31.
When Cameron tried to grab the knife away from Defendant, Defendant sliced Cameron's hand.
R. 215: 31. Defendant then reached out and stabbed Cameron in the arm. R. 215: 32.
Cameron backed off and "tried to get away," but Defendant got out of the car and followed
5

Cameron into the parking lot. R. 215: 32. Cameron ran away, "trying to dodge" Defendant, but
Defendant caught up with him and stabbed him in the back and the chest. R. 215: 34.
Pamela Lomax, Tifany Herrera, and Cindy Young all witnessed the attack on Cameron.
R. 214: 43, 89; 215: 158. When Cindy Young looked outside, she "saw a man running with a
knife." R. 214: 89. She then saw Cameron running away from Defendant with "blood running
. . . all the way down his arm." R. 214: 89. Pamela likewise saw Defendant "getting out of his
car with a knife, holding it up like this, and [Cameron] running across the parking lot." R. 214:
43. As Cameron ran away, Pamela saw Defendant "chasing him" with the knife. R. 214: 43.
Pamela heard Defendant say to Cameron: "I'm going to kill you[J you little punk." R. 214: 46.
Pamela and Tifany started screaming for Cameron to come take shelter inside their home. R.
214: 44. They saw Cameron "running around trying to stay away from" Defendant, and then
watched as Defendant reached Cameron and stabbed him in the back. R. 214: 44-45; 215: 159.
Still back at the curb where she had been hit, Kathy saw Cameron retreat from the car
with "blood all over him." R. 215: 75. She also saw Defendant run after Cameron with a knife
and stab him in the back. R. 215: 76. Kathy then turned Cameron's dog, Tyson, loose; when
Tyson reached Defendant, Defendant stabbed Tyson in the throat. R. 215: 34, 76; 215:159-60.
Defendant then approached Kathy and said, "Get up bitch. You're getting in the car." R.
215:77. Defendant also said, "today is going to be the end of it." R. 215: 86. When it became
apparent that Kathy could not walk due to her injuries, Defendant began dragging her toward
the car. R. 215: 77. As he did so, he hit her in the head with the knife and said, "now talk to me
bitch." R. 215:35,77.
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Pamela Lomax saw Defendant approach Kathy as she was "laying on the ground
screaming." R. 214: 45-46. Pamela also saw Defendant "going like this up and down her neck
with a knife." R. 214: 46. As Defendant held the knife to Kathy's throat, Tifany Herrera heard
Defendant say, "kill you bitch." R. 215: 161.
Pamela called 911 during the attack. R. 214: 44-45. When Defendant heard sirens in the
distance, he let go of Kathy and fled in his car. R. 214: 47-48; R. 215: 77. Pamela then ran
outside and tried to help Kathy. R. 214: 48. Kathy was "panicky" and complained that "her
ankle hurt really bad." R. 214: 49-50. When Pamela looked at it, the ankle looked like it was
injured. R. 214: 50.
During this time, Cameron's dog, Tyson, was laying nearby, ccbleeding profusely out of
his neck." R. 214: 48. Tyson's "throat was slashed from one end to the other, and the blood
was just squirting out of his neck." R. 214: 50. Pamela "ripped his collar o f f and tried to stop
the bleeding. R. 214: 48, 50. When an animal services officer eventually arrived'on the scene,
she observed a "stab wound about an inch in length" on Tyson's neck. R. 215: 106.
"Everybody was upset"
Officer Keltsey Ware was the first officer to arrive on the scene. R. 214: 61, 63. Officer
Ware saw "a lot of blood" when he surveyed the parking lot. R. 214: 69. There was blood on
Kathy, blood on the porch near Kathy, blood on Cameron, blood on the porch where Cameron
was laying, "splatters of blood throughout the parking lot," and "blood on a couple of vehicles."
R. 214: 69-71.
Officer Ware also saw two clusters of people: one clustered around Kathy, and one
clustered around Cameron. R. 214: 63. There were approximately 25 people on the scene,

7

"mostly mothers and children." R. 214: 79. "Everybody was upset," and there were "numerous
people with blood on their arms" from trying to help the injured victims. R. 214: 79.
Officer Ware approached Cameron, who had his shirt off and was "bleeding pretty
heavily." R. 214: 63, 76. It appeared as if Cameron might pass out. R. 214: 63. Officer Ware
called for medical help, helped stabilize Cameron, and turned to check on Kathy. R. 214: 64.
When Officer Ware approached Kathy, he "could tell she was injured on her foot and
[on] her hand," and he also noticed that she was "quite distressed." R. 214: 64. Kathy told
Officer Ware that she and Cameron had gone to get food and that when they had returned,
Defendant was in "front of her house in the parking lot." R 214: 65-66. She said that while she
was trying to get into her apartment, Defendant drove his vehicle into her and hit her. R. 214:
66. Kathy also told Officer Ware that she saw Defendant with a knife. R. 214: 74. Officer
Ware's conversation with Kathy lasted for "a few minutes," and took place "right after" he
arrived on the scene. R. 214: 72. Kathy was "upset throughout this conversation." R. 214: 72.
Detective Mary Winters responded to the scene approximately ninety minutes after the
attack. R. 215:179-80. Detective Winters spoke with Kathy while Kathy was still sitting on her
front porch, "upset" and "crying." R. 215: 181. Kathy told Detective Winters that during the
previous months, Defendant had told her that she "would be his until her last dying breath." R.
215: 183. Kathy recounted the events from the previous night, claiming that Defendant had
pushed her and threatened to kill her. R. 215: 183. Kathy told Detective Winters that
Defendant had then hit her with his car 90 minutes earlier, and that when he had turned the car
around to run her over again, her son Cameron had intervened. R. 215: 184-86. Kathy also
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described how Defendant had then stabbed Cameron, returned to her, and said: '"You're coming
with me, bitch. I'm going to kill you." R. 215: 186.
Defendant is charged
On November 16, 2006, Defendant was charged with two counts of attempted
aggravated murder, one count of assault, and one count of cruelty to an animal.

R. 1-2. To

support the aggravated murder charges, the State alleged that Defendant had previously been
convicted of murder. R. 1-2.
Defendant raises a Batson objection prior to trial
Defendant's jury trial began on December 5,2007. R. 137-38. After voir dire, the parties
passed the panel for cause and exercised their peremptory challenges. R. 243: 89-90. During
this process, an unrecorded side bar discussion took place. R. 243:100-01. Afterwards, defense
counsel accepted the jury "with the information noted in the side bar." R. 243: 101. The jury
was sworn, and the remaining venire was dismissed. R. 243: 101.
The court then held a hearing outside the presence of the jury, during which defense
counsel noted that he had made "an exception" during the voir dire side bar regarding the
State's use of a peremptory challenge on Samuel Curry, who was number 46 on the jury list. R.
214: 16. Defense counsel acknowledged that he was uncertain of Curry's ethnicity: "I'm not
going to hazard to guess as to Mr. Curry's racial background. He did, however, appear to be the
only racial minority on the jury panel." R. 214: 16. But defense counsel nevertheless argued
that insofar as Curry "appear [ed] to be the only individual of a racial minority" on the panel, the
State had committed a Batson error by striking Curry from the panel. R. 214: 16.

9

The State asked the court if Defendant had successfully made a prima facie case of
discriminatory intent. R. 214:17. The court ruled that Defendant had made a prima facie case
and directed the State to explain its strike. R. 214: 17. The State offered two reasons for
striking Curry: first, that Curry had "indicated that he was deaf in his right ear," and second,
that "he struck me as to[o] young." R. 214: 17.
Following the State's explanation, the court denied Defendant's Batson objection "[f)or all
those reasons." R. 214: 17. The court did not make any other specific findings regarding its
denial of the objection.
Proceedings related to the aggravated offense
As noted above, the aggravated charges in this case were based on the State's contention
that Defendant had previously been convicted of murder. R. 1-2 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 76-5202(h) (West 2004)). On November 19, 2007, the trial court granted Defendant's request to
bifurcate the trial on the underlying charges from trial on this aggravator. R. 139: 5-6.
During the proceedings on the underlying charges, Defendant repeatedly acknowledged
that he had been convicted of murder. During the hearing on Defendant's motion to bifurcate,
for example, defense counsel explained that the charge of attempted aggravated murder was
"based on a prior conviction Mr. Jackson was previously convicted of in a homicide in the early
eighties." R. 139: 5.
On the third day of trial, defense counsel referred to this conviction again when
discussing an evidentiary question with the court. Specifically, after the State had rested, defense
counsel sought guidance from the court prior to beginning his case-in-chief.

R. 216: 3-4.

Defense counsel asked the court whether Defendant's prior conviction would be admissible if
10

Defendant testified. R. 216: 3-4. When asked for an explanation, defense counsel proffered
that Defendant had been convicted of a homicide 24 years prior, due to the fact that he had
killed "his spouse . . . with a gun." R. 216: 10. Following argument from the parties, the court
concluded that the prior conviction would be admissible if Defendant took the stand and
claimed self-defense. R. 216:18-22. On advice of counsel, Defendant did not testify in his own
behalf. R. 216:52.
After the close of the evidence, the jury convicted Defendant on all underlying charges.
R. 148. After the jury issued its verdict, the court held a bench trial on the aggravator. R. 207:
1-7.

In its case-in-chief, the State submitted certified copies of the Information and the

Judgment & Conviction from the prior case. R. 207: 3. These documents showed that Henry
Jackson had been convicted of murder. R. 207: 3. The State then rested. R. 207: 4.
In response, Defendant did not argue that those convictions involved a different person.
Defendant instead introduced a docket sheet from "the same case" that suggested that
Defendant had only been convicted of manslaughter, not murder, and Defendant then argued
that his manslaughter conviction did not support the aggravated charges. R. 207:4-5. The court
then asked for briefing on this question. R. 207: 5-6.
Rather than filing a brief on the manslaughter question, however, Defendant instead
filed a brief arguing that the State's documents were insufficient to prove the aggravator because
they did not prove that he was the same Henry Jackson who had been convicted in the prior
case. R. 199-204. In its written response, the State noted that Defendant had never raised this
issue prior to his post-trial brief, and the State accordingly asked the court to reopen the matter
so that it could offer evidence on the question. R. 208-11.
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The court held a hearing on January 28, 2008. R. 232: 1-14. At the hearing, the
prosecutor pointed out that defense counsel had "repeatedly and unequivocally made
admissions that his client had a prior conviction" during the trial, and she explained that she had
not put on evidence regarding the identity question precisely because of Defendant's repeated
admissions. R. 232: 6. The court agreed, and it accordingly "exercise[d] its discretion" to "reopen the matter" and allow the State to present evidence on the identity question. R. 232: 4-7.
On April 21, 2008, the court held a hearing at which the State presented its evidence.2
On stipulation from defense counsel, the State proffered that it could prove that Defendant
been convicted of murder in 1982 by offering testimony from the original prosecutor, a
fingerprint expert, and Defendant's current wife, as well as with photos of Defendant from
1982. R. 237: 4-6. The State also submitted six documents showing that Henry L. Jackson had
been convicted of second degree murder in 1982. Exhibits Folder: State's Exhibits 1-6. The
court accepted this evidence and found that the State had proven the aggravator. R. 237: 8-9.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Issue I: Kathy Capellan's statements to Officer Ware were admissible as excited
utterances because Kathy made the statements while she was in pain and upset. Defendant is
incorrect when he suggests that these events were insufficiently startling to provoke such a
response. To the contrary, the undisputed testimony below showed that Kathy made these
statements just moments after Defendant had hit her with his car, stabbed her son, and slit her

2

At the January 2008 hearing, the State explained that the original prosecutor was
currently away on military leave. R. 232: 5. Given this, the Court continued the matter until
April 2008 to allow the State to obtain his testimony. R. 232: 10, 13.
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dog's throat. Defendant is also incorrect when he suggests that the excited utterance rule is
limited to a particular number of statements. Rather, the rule is applicable as long as the
statements were made while the declarant was still under the stress of the startling event.
In any event, even if the trial court erred by admitting these statements, the error was
harmless. According to Defendant's own claim, Kathy's statements to Officer Ware were
merely repetitive of testimony that was introduced at trial through other witnesses. Given the
overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt, Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced
by the alleged error.
Issue II: Kathy's statements to Detective Winters were admissible as prior consistent
statements. Kathy made those statements shortly after the attack, and they directly rebutted
Defendant's claim at trial that her story was fabricated. While it is true that statements must
predate the alleged motive to fabricate in order to qualify under this rule, Defendant did not
preserve his claim that these statements were made before Kathy developed her alleged motive
to fabricate.
Even if the court erred, however, the error was harmless. As with the statements to
Officer Ware, Kathy's statements to Detective Winters were hardly unique. Instead, by
Defendant's own admission, these statements were cumulative of other testimony offered at
trial. Given the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's guilt, Defendant has not shown that he
was prejudiced by this alleged error.
Issue III: Defendant's Batson objection was untimely. Although Defendant raised his
objection during the selection process, he did not obtain a ruling on the objection until after the
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jury pool had been dismissed. This was untimely under the law that was in effect at the time of
this trial.
Even if addressed on the merits, this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of
Defendant's Batson claim.

The State presented two facially neutral justifications for the

challenged strike: first, that the juror in question was partially deaf, and second, that the juror in
question was too young. The trial court did not clearly err when it accepted the prosecutor's
proffered explanations. The prosecutor had legitimate reason to be concerned about the
prospective juror's hearing loss due to the nature of the testimony that it intended to present at
trial, and precedent also allows the State to strike jurors based on their youthfulness or lack of
life experience. In addition, Defendant has failed to offer any evidence showing that the
prosecutor was motivated by a racial animus when she struck this proposed juror.
Issue IV: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted three nongruesome photographs of Cameron's wounds under rule 403. These photographs had clear
probative value. These photographs not only helped prove that Defendant repeatedly stabbed
Cameron, but they were also relevant to rebut Defendant's self-defense claim. In addition, these
photographs did not create the risk of unfair prejudice by leading the jury to convict Defendant
based on something other than the established propositions of the case. In any event, even if
these photographs were unfairly prejudicial, the error was harmless.
Issue V: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it reopened the trial on the
aggravator to permit the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's identity.

It is well

established in Utah that a trial court has discretion to reopen a case to receive additional
evidence at any time prior to verdict. In this case, the trial court reopened the case to allow the
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State to rebut Defendant's post-trial claim that it had failed to prove his identity. This was not
an abuse of discretion.
Issue VI: The State did not violate its discovery obligations when it released the vehicle
Defendant drove during the attack to its lienholder before Defendant had conducted testing on
the blood stains. Defendant did not request access to the vehicle until almost year into the
pretrial process, and the State was not put on notice of Defendant's theory regarding the blood
stains until after the vehicle had been released. If Defendant had believed that the car or the
bloodstains had any exculpatory value, he could have obtained the evidence through reasonable
discovery efforts. He did not do so.
Even if the State erred, however, the error was harmless. Contrary to Defendant's claim,
the presence of dog's blood within the car would not have undermined either of the two
attempted aggravated murder charges. First, the charge relating to Kathy was not dependant on
the bloodstains, but was instead dependant on the separate question of whether Defendant had
hit her with his car. Moreover, it is undisputed that Defendant sliced the dog's throat open and
then drove off in the car. Thus, even if there had been dog's blood in the car, this would have
simply suggested that the dog had bled on Defendant before he left the scene. Second, the
presence of dog's blood within the car would also have had no impact on the charge relating to
Cameron. Regardless of whether Cameron was initially the aggressor, Defendant could not
claim self-defense where he got out of the car, chased Cameron through a parking lot, and
stabbed him in the back. Given this, as well as the overwhelming evidence from other sources
regarding Defendant's guilt, the trial court did not err when it denied Defendant's motion.
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Issue VII: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Defendant to
serve consecutive sentences. Defendant ran over his ex-girlfriend, stabbed her son four times,
and sliced open a dog's throat. In addition, Defendant had already been convicted for shooting
his first wife in the face. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
ARGUMENT
I.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR W H E N IT ADMITTED
KATHY CAPELLAN'S STATEMENTS TO OFFICER WARE
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted Kathy's statements to
Officer Ware as excited utterances. Aplt. Br. 21-25. Defendant is incorrect. Even if the trial
court did err, however, the error was harmless.
A. Kathy's statements to Officer Ware were excited utterances.
Under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule, a statement is not excluded if it
"relat[es] to a startling event or condition" and is "made while the declarant was under the stress
of excitement caused by the event or condition." Utah R. Evid. 803(2).
Defendant argues that the excited utterance rule was inapplicable because Kathy was not
under the stress of the events when she spoke to Officer Ware. Aplt. Br. 24-25. Defendant also
argues that Kathy's conversation with Officer Ware was too long to qualify as an utterance.
Aplt. Br. 24. Both arguments should be rejected.
1. Contrary to Defendant's claim, Kathy's statements were made while
she was under the stress of Defendant's violent attack.
Defendant claims that Kathy's statements to Officer Ware were not excited utterances
because Kathy was not under the stress of the events when she spoke to Officer Ware. Aplt. Br.
24-25. Defendant is incorrect
16

In order to qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must be made after an event that
"cause[d] an excitement that stills normal reflective thought processes." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d
236, 239 (Utah 1995). "A person who gives a statement under stress of nervous excitement
need not be hysterical as long as she is still under the emotional influence of the event." State v.
Kaytso, 684 P.2d 63, 64 (Utah 1984). Although the exception "is usually said to require
'excitement' on the part of the declarant," the "term must be given a broad meaning to include
any aroused emotional state that is likely to still reflective capacity, such as fear and shock."
Smith, 909 P.2d at 240 n.2.
In this case, Kathy spoke to Officer Ware shordy after Defendant had run her over her
twice, lined up his car to run over her again, stabbed her son four times, stabbed her son's dog
in the throat, tried dragging her to his car by her hair, put a knife to her throat, and threatened to
kill her. R. 214: 44-46, 89; 215: 27-28, 31-34, 73-77,161. These violent, traumatic events were
clearly startling enough to produce an "aroused emotional state" such as "fear" or "shock."
Smith, 909 P.2d at 240 n.2.
In response, Defendant first claims that these events were not startling enough
because Kathy only received "minor injuries." Aplt Br. 25. But the excited utterance rule
does not require that the declarant be injured. To the contrary, "[pjhysical violence, though
often present, is not required. An automobile accident, pain or an injury, an attack by a dog,
a fight, seeing a photograph in a newspaper, and a wide range of other events may qualify.
The courts look primarily to the effect upon the declarant and if satisfied that the event was
such as to cause adequate excitement, the inquiry is ended." 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272
(6th ed. 2006).
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In this case, Kathy was clearly shaken up by this violent encounter. When Pamela
Lomax ran over to Kathy shordy after the attack, for example, Kathy was "panicky." R. 214:4950. When Officer Ware arrived on the scene moments later, Kathy was "quite distressed" and
"upset." R. 214: 64, 72. In fact, when Detective Winters arrived on the scene approximately an
hour and a half later, Kathy was still "upset" and "crying." R. 215: 181.
Defendant next suggests that this was not an excited utterance because there was a
"crowd of neighbors" on the scene to offer "aid and comfort." Aplt. Br. 25. Contrary to
Defendant's claim, these additional people only exacerbated the stress of the event. When
Officer Ware arrived, he saw approximately 25 people on scene. R. 214: 79. These were
"mosdy mothers and children," and many of them had "blood on their arms and hands [from]
trying to help the wounded." R. 214:79. "Everybody was upset," and the scene was decidedly
"chaotic." R. 214: 79. The presence of these bloodied, upset caregivers did not render Kathy's
statements inadmissible as excited utterances.
In short, Kathy spoke to Officer Ware moments after Defendant ran her over, stabbed
her son, and stabbed her son's dog in the throat. Her statements to Officer Ware were made
while she was under the immediate strain of these traumatic events, and these statements were
therefore admissible as excited utterances.
2. Kathy's statements were utterances for purposes of the excited
utterance rule.
Defendant also argues that Kathy's statements to Officer Ware were not "utterances" for
purposes of the excited utterance rule because Officer Ware's conversation with Kathy was too
long. Aplt. Br. 24. Defendant is incorrect.
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In West Valley City v. Hutto, 2000 UT App 188,fflj2,14, 5 P.3d 1, this Court held that a
victim's "thirty to forty-five minute conversation" with an officer did not qualify as an utterance
for purposes of the excited utterance rule. This Court explained that the excited utterance rule
does not allow an officer to "recount a victim's entire story under the guise of the excited
utterance exception," but is instead limited to "truly spontaneous outbursts." Id. at f 14
(quotations and citation omitted). In State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 449 (Utah 1989), the
supreme court similarly held that an officer could not repeat "everything which the victim had
told her during [a] one-hour interview" as an utterance.
Although the statements at issue in Hutto and Thomaswere inadmissible, this limitation on
the excited utterance rule is not as narrow as Defendant now suggests. The supreme court's
decision in State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995), is instructive. In Smith, a six-year old girl
was abducted at knife point from her home and raped. Id. at 238-39. She was found by
neighbors approximately an hour later and taken to a hospital. Id. at 239. Approximately oneto-two hours after the attack, the victim was questioned by a child abuse investigator. Id.
During this interview, the victim was "in pain, crying, and very upset." Id.
On appeal, the supreme court held that the victim's statements to the investigator were
admissible as excited utterances. Id. at 239-42. Importantly, the supreme court did not impose
any sort of length-based limitation on the number of excited utterances that the traumatized
child could offer. To the contrary, the court allowed the investigator to recount all of the
relevant details that the victim had told her about the attack. This included statements that: (1) a
man had "driven her to a dirt road," (2) that he had "raped and sodomized her," and (3) that he
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had "returned her" to her home. Id. at 239. This also included the victim's statements about: (4)
the attacker's clothing, (5) the attacker's car, and (6) the car's contents. Id.
In Kaytso, 684 P.2d at 64, the supreme court similarly allowed an officer to testify
regarding a victim's answers to a number of "specific questions" regarding the attack. As in
Smith, the supreme court did not limit the officer to a specified number of questions or answers.
Id. Instead, the court simply held that the statements were admissible because the victim was
"still under the emotional influence of the event" at the time the statements were made. Id.
Thus, while some Utah courts have cautioned against allowing an officer to provide a
"narrative" description of a conversation, Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, f 14, the critical question
under this rule is not the number of questions the officer asked or the length of the victim's
answers. Rather, "what is critical is a mental state that tends to block reflection and the
reasoning process." Smith, 909 P.2d at 241. Thus, if an officer speaks to a traumatized crime
victim in the aftermath of a violent attack, the victim's statements are admissible, regardless of
whether the officer asked a particular number of questions or elicited a particularly lengthy
response.
In any event, unlike the conversations at issue in Hutto and Thomas, this conversation was
relatively brief. The conversation at issue in Hutto lasted for "thirty to forty-five minute[s],"
2000 UT App 188, ^| 2, and the conversation at issue in Thomas lasted for an hour. 777 P.2d at
449. By contrast, Kathy only spoke to Officer Ware for a "few minutes . . . right after [he] got
on scene." R. 214: 72.
Moreover, the record does not support Defendant's claim that Officer Ware gave an
unfettered "narrative account," nor does it support the claim that Officer Ware "reconstructed
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his entire conversation with Kathy." Aplt. Br. 24. To the contrary, the record shows that
Officer Ware simply responded to the prosecutor's questions about what Kathy told him in the
moments following Defendant's attack. R. 214: 64-66, 71-74. This account was punctuated by
seven different objections, as well as Defendant's request for a sidebar. R. 214: 64-66, 71-74.
More importantly, the prosecutor never asked Officer Ware to recount the entire conversation,
nor did Officer Ware ever indicate that his testimony was meant to be comprehensive.
But even if the prosecutor had elicited the entirety of Kathy's statements, they still would
have been admissible as utterances. Again, the "critical" question is whether the statements
were made while the declarant still had "a mental state that tends to block reflection and the
reasoning process." Smithy 909 P.2d at 241. In contrast to Hutto, this was not a situation in
which an officer gave a detailed reconstruction of a lengthy conversation that had occurred long
after the events in question. Instead, Officer Ware simply described a brief conversation that
occurred in the immediate aftermath of a violent attack.
In short, rule 803(2) does not set forth a "brief utterance" rule. Rather, it sets forth an
"excited utterance" rule. And in this case, Kathy's statements to Officer Ware were made while
she was in the "aroused emotional state[s]" of "fear and shock." Smith, 909 P.2d at 240 n.2.
Under these circumstances, these statements were admissible under the excited utterance rule.
B. Even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting these statements,
the error was harmless.
"Notwithstanding error by the trial court, we will not reverse a conviction if we find that
the error was harmless." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^f 45, 55 P.3d 573. "An error is harmless
when it is sufficiendy inconsequential that we conclude there is no reasonable likelihood that the
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error affected the outcome of the proceedings." State v. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, % 28,153
P.3d 830 (quotations and citation omitted). In the hearsay context, the Utah Supreme Court has
deemed an error harmless when the improperly admitted statements were "merely cumulative to
that already testified to by the victim." Thomas, 111 P.2d at 450; see also Smith, 909 P.2d at 246.
In this case, Defendant does not point to any statement made by Officer Ware that was
not also made by Kathy and Cameron when they testified at trial. Aplt. Br. 28-31. To the
contrary, Defendant only complains that Officer Ware "bolstered" Kathy's case by repeating her
same story. Aplt. Br. 30. Thus, by Defendant's own admission, Officer Ware's testimony was
"merely cumulative." Thomas, 111 P.2d at 450.
More importantly, the State presented overwhelming evidence that supported its case.
Even putting aside the testimony offered by Kathy and Cameron, the State presented multiple
witnesses who saw that Kathy's foot and ankle were injured (R. 214: 50; 214: 64), multiple
witnesses who saw Defendant chase Cameron through the parking lot and stab him in the back
(R. 214: 43-45, 89, 215:158-59), a witness who heard Defendant tell Cameron that he was going
to kill him (R. 214: 46), a witness who saw Defendant stab Cameron's dog (R. 215: 159-60), and
multiple witnesses who saw Defendant assaulting Kathy and making threats to her life while
trying to drag her back to his car (R. 214: 46; 215: 161). In addition, while Defendant claims
that he was the victim here, he emerged from this confrontation unscathed, while Cameron
went to the ER with four potentially life-threatening stab wounds (R. 214: 32-34), his dog had
an inch long stab wound across its throat (R. 215: 106), and Kathy had injuries to her ankle and
foot (R. 214: 50; 214: 64).
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Given this, there is no reasonable likelihood that the result would have been any different
if Officer Ware had not been allowed to offer his cumulative account of Kathy's post-attack
interview. Even if there was error, it was harmless.
II.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR WHEN IT ADMITTED
KATHY'S STATEMENTS TO DETECTIVE WINTERS
Under rule 801(d)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence, a statement is not hearsay if it is
"consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against the declarant of recent fabrication."
In Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150,158 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held
that statements do not qualify under the corresponding federal rule unless they were "made
before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose." In State v. Bujan, 2008 UT 47, TflJ 812, 190 P.3d 1255, the Utah Supreme Court adopted the Tome analysis for purposes of Utah's
rule 801(d)(1). Thus, under this rule, a statement is "admitted as nonhearsay" if it "predate [d]"
the declarant's alleged "motive" to fabricate. Bujan, 2008 UT 47, \ 1; Tome, 513 U.S. at 158.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it admitted Kathy's statements to
Detective Winters as prior consistent statements. Aplt. Br. 26-28. This argument is both
inadequately briefed and substantively incorrect. But even if these statements were inadmissible
as prior consistent statements, the error was harmless.
A. Defendant's Bujan argument is inadequately briefed.
Under rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a party must support an
argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the recordrelied on." (Emphasis
added.) This rule is not satisfied when a defendant offers a vague claim of error. Rather, the
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rule requires a defendant to "plead his claims with sufficient specificity for this court to make a
ruling on the merits." Allen v. Fuel, 2008 UT 56, \ 9, 194 P.3d 903.
In this case, Defendant's argument is not specific enough to allow this Court to "make a
ruling on the merits." Id. Although Defendant generally claims that Detective Winters should
not have been permitted to recount Kathy's statements, Aplt. Br. 26-28, Detective does not ever
specify which statement(s) he finds objectionable. Instead, he merely suggests that all of
Detective Winters' testimony was inadmissible under the prior consistent statement rule. Aplt
Br. 27.
As explained above, however, the rule set forth in Tome and Bujan is statement-specific.
Under this rule, a court compares the time at which "the alleged influence, or motive to
fabricate, arose" with the time at which the particular statement was made. Tome, 513 U.S. at
158. In order to make this comparison, a court must not only know what the alleged motive to
fabricate was, but also which particular statement is at issue.
In this case, Detective Winters related Kathy's statements about a wide number of
subjects, including Kathy's prior relationship with Defendant, Defendant having stalked her,
Defendant's threats against her on November 8, and the November 9 attack itself. See generally
R. 215: 182-88. Insofar as Defendant does not identify any particular statement for review, this
Court cannot make the specific comparison contemplated by Bujan and Tome. This argument is
therefore inadequately briefed, and it should be rejected on this basis.
B. Even if adequately briefed, this argument should still be rejected.
Rather than challenging any particular statement, Defendant instead offers two general
motivations for Kathy to have lied, apparently arguing that these same motivations applied to all
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of Kathy's statements. First, Defendant claims that Kathy lied to "protect herself and Hardman
from being charged with any offenses" from their own conduct on November 9; second,
Defendant claims that Kathy lied to avoid a perjury charge. Aplt. Br. 27. Even if this was
adequately briefed, both arguments should still be rejected.
First, Defendant did not preserve his argument regarding Kathy or Cameron having
somehow committed a crime while being attacked on November 9.

"It is well settled that

'claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."' State v. Garner, 2008 UT
App 32, ^| 11, 177 P.3d 637 (citation omitted). To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant
"must enter an objection on the record that is both timely and specific." State v. Range!, 866 P.2d
607, 611 (Utah App. 1993). "The objection must be specific enough to give the trial court notice
of the very error of which [the party] complains." Garner, 2008 UT App 32, ^j 11 (quotations and
citation omitted) (alteration in original). This preservation rule "applies to every claim, including
constitutional questions." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11, 10 P.3d 346.
When the prosecutor first questioned Detective Winters about her conversation with
Kathy, Defendant objected during an off-the-record discussion. R. 215:180,182. The following
day, the parties made a record of what had transpired. R. 216: 22-24. The prosecutor explained
that although Defendant had objected to the testimony, the testimony had been admitted under
the prior consistent statement rule because defense counsel had suggested that Kathy was lying
during his cross-examination of her. R. 216: 23. In response, defense counsel explained the
nature of his objection as follows: "[OJur objection—our questions to Mrs. Capellen were
limited to whether she was aware of the punishment or possible punishment for perjury. We did
not make any allegation of a recent fabrication beyond that." R. 216: 23 (emphasis added).
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Thus, by Defendant's own admission, he did not base his objection to these statements
on a claim that Kathy was trying to avoid being charged for her substantive conduct during the
November 9 incident. Rather, Defendant's objection was strictly limited to the allegation that
Kathy was trying to avoid a perjury charge. As such, Defendant did not preserve his claim that
Kathy lied to Detective Winters to avoid being charged for having attacked Defendant on
November 9.3
Second, Defendant is also incorrect when he argues that Kathy's alleged motivation to
avoid a perjury charge predated her statements to Detective Winters. Aplt. Br. 27. In Utah, a
person commits perjury by making false statements while under oath. See Utah Code Ann. § 768-502 (West 2004). At trial, for example, defense counsel claimed that Kathy was committing
perjury because she "showed up in court today and gave a different story than [she'd] given in
the past" R. 215: 90. But there is no indication that Kathy was under oath at the time that she
spoke to Detective Winters. Thus, any fear of perjury would have arisen at trial, not during the
initial conversation with Detective Winters. This fear would have post-dated the statements
themselves. Bujan is therefore inapplicable to these statements.
Moreover, Defendant has not separately argued that Kathy was also motivated by a
desire to avoid being charged under Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-506 (West 2004), which
makes it illegal to give a false statement to a police officer, instead consistently couching his

3

During his closing argument, Defendant did develop this substantive claim.
Specifically, he argued that Kathy and Cameron were the aggressors during the incident, and
that Kathy had then lied in order to protect herself and Cameron from facing charges. R. 216:
65-67. But the record does not show that Defendant ever renewed his objection to Detective
Winters' testimony on this basis.
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argument in terms of "perjury." See generally Aplt. Br. 27-28; R. 215: 90; R. 216: 23. But even if
Defendant had advanced this argument, this, too, would have been unavailing. If Kathy had
been afraid of such charges, this fear would have created an incentive to tell the truth, not to lie.
Put differently, the threat of criminal punishment encourages lawfulness, not lawlessness.
Defendant has not shown how the threat of criminal prosecution encourages a person to break
the predicate law, rather than obey it. Thus, Defendant has not pointed to a pre-statement
motive to lie. Even if Defendant had raised this argument, Bujan would have therefore been
inapplicable.
C. In any event, even if the trial court did err in admitting these statements,
the error was harmless.
As with the statements from Officer Ware, Defendant does not point to any statement
made by Detective Winters that was not also made by other witnesses at trial. Aplt. Br. 28-31.
For example, Defendant complains that Detective Winters testified that Defendant was stalking
Kathy prior to the November 9 attack. Aplt. Br. 30. But Kathy and Tifany Herrera both
testified about the stalking as well. R. 215: 65-66, 154-55. Defendant also complains that
Detective Winters was allowed to recount Kathy's claim that Defendant had once told her that
she would be his "until her dying breath." Aplt. Br. 30. But Kathy also testified about that
statement at trial, explaining that "[h]e used to tell me I was his girl until I didn't have any breath
in my body." R. 215: 85.
Finally, Defendant argues that Detective Winters provided "more detail than Kathy"
about the threats Defendant made while trying to drag Kathy back to his car. Aplt. Br. 30-31.
At trial, Kathy testified that while Defendant was dragging her back to his car, he hit her on the
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head with his knife and said "now talk to me bitch." R. 215: 77. She also testified that
Defendant told her that "today is going to be the end of it." R. 215: 86. Detective Winters
admittedly testified somewhat differently, claiming that Kathy had told her that Defendant had
held a knife to her throat while saying "I'm going to kill you." R. 215: 186. But contrary to
Defendant's suggestion, Detective Winters' account was also corroborated by other witnesses.
Specifically, Pamela Lomax testified that she saw Defendant "going like this up and down her
neck with a knife," R. 214: 46, and Tifany Herrera testified that she saw Defendant hold a knife
to Kathy's throat, hit her, and say "kill you, bitch." R. 215: 161.
In short, as with his argument regarding Officer Ware's testimony, Defendant's
complaint is that Detective Winters was allowed to "bolsterf]" Kathy's testimony by "repeating
it."

Aplt. Br. 27. As in Thomas, however, Detective Winters' statements were "merely

cumulative to that already testified to by the victim" and other witnesses, and "[n]othing new or
additional was said in the interview which [the other witnesses] had not already testified to at
trial." Thomas, 111 P.2d at 450. Moreover, given the overwhelming evidence of Defendant's
guilt that was offered by other witnesses at trial, Defendant has not established a reasonable
probability that the result would have been different without this decidedly cumulative
testimony. Rhinehart, 2006 UT App 517, If 28.
The error, if any, was harmless.
III.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR W H E N IT D E N I E D
DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY
BATSONOBJECTION
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his Batson objection.
Aplt. Br. 31-35. Defendant's argument should be rejected for two reasons. First, Defendant's
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Batson objection was untimely. Second, even if Defendant raised a timely objection, the trial
court correctly rejected it.
A. Defendant's Batson objection was untimely.4
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the state uses a peremptory challenge to
"purposefully excludef]" potential jurors based on race. In Utah, "a Batson challenge must be
raised not only before the jury is sworn, but also before the remainder of the venire is dismissed
in order to be deemed timely." State v. Valde^ 2006 UT 39, \ 38,140 P.3d 1219. When a "trial
court fails to timely resolve a Batson objection, defense counsel... has an absolute obligation to
notify the court that resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed."
State v. Rosa-Re {Rosa-Re J), 2008 UT 53, \ 8,190 P.3d 1259.
In this case, Defendant raised his Batson objection before the jury was sworn, but he did
not obtain a ruling on the objection until after the jury had been sworn and the remaining venire
dismissed. R. 243:101. Defendant's Batson objection was therefore untimely under Valde^&nd
Rosa-Re.
In response, Defendant notes that although Va/de^wzs issued prior to his trial, Rosa-Re I
was not.5 Aplt. Br. 35. Defendant then argues that under Valde^ he was only required to raise
the claim prior to the jury panel being dismissed. Aplt. Br. 35. Defendant is incorrect.

4

The trial court rejected defendant's Batson objection on the merits, not on timeliness
grounds. It is well settled, however, that an appellate court may affirm a trial court's decision on
alternate grounds. See State v. Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305, \ 31 n.4, 989 P.2d 503.
5
The supreme court issued Valde^ in July 2006, and Rosa Re was issued in July 2008.
Defendant was tried from December 5-7, 2007. R. 137-38, 142-43, 197-98.
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Contrary to Defendant's claim, Rosa-Re land Valde^both required a defendant to obtain
a ruling on his Batson objection prior to dismissal of the venire. In Valde^ 2006 UT 39, \ 33
n.19, the supreme court warned that a procedure "whereby an objection was made prior to the
swearing of the jury but not addressed by the court until after the jury was sworn in and
dismissed, will generally not meet the standard we set forth today." The court explained that
this rule is necessary "in order to allow the trial court to adequately remedy a Batson violation if
one has occurred." Id. If an objection is raised—but not ruled on—prior to dismissal of the
venire, the judge is prevented from "reinstating the stricken juror," thus requiring a mistrial. Id.
at \ 44. The supreme court accordingly saw "no legitimate reason to sanction such an inefficient
use of judicial time and resources," and it therefore held that even allowing a "Batson challenge
to proceed after the venire has been dismissed is only to sanction abuse." Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, contrary to Defendant's claim, Va/de^did not hold that a Batson objection is timely
as long as it is raised before the venire is dismissed. Valde^ specifically refused to "sanction"
such an approach, instead holding that a party raising a Batson objection must also obtain a
ruling on the objection in time to effectively cure it. Id. And in this case, Defendant failed to
obtain a ruling on his Batson objection until after the venire was dismissed, thereby preventing
the trial court from curing the alleged error by simply reinstating Samuel Curry. Defendant's
objection was therefore untimely under Valde^. Consequently, his Batson claim should be
rejected on this basis alone.
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B. Even if addressed on the merits, this Court should reject Defendant's
Batson challenge.
The Supreme Court has adopted a 3-step analysis for a Batson claim:
Under our Batson jurisprudence, once the opponent of [the] peremptory challenge
has made out a prima facie case of racial discrimination (step one), the burden of
production shifts to the proponent of the strike to come forward with a raceneutral explanation (step two). If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial
court must then decide (step three) whether the opponent of the strike has
proved purposeful racial discrimination.
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). "Under this analytical framework, the burden of
producing evidence shifts between the parties. At all times, however, the 'ultimate burden of
persuasion in a Batson challenge rests with the opponent of the peremptory challenge/" State v.
Rosa-Re (Rosa-Re II), 2008 UT App 472, % 3,200 P.3d 670 (citation omitted), cert, denied'207 P.3d
432.
Step One: There is no issue with respect to step one in this case. "Once a prosecutor
has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled
on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the
defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot." Hernande^ v. New York, 500 U.S.
352, 359 (1991). Although the State does not concede that Defendant successfully made a
prima facie showing in this case, the issue was mooted when the State offered its explanations
and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question. State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 547 (Utah
1996); State v. Chatwin, 2002 UT App 363, \ 10, 58 P.3d 867.
Step Two: Under step two, the State only needs to offer a "neutral explanation" for its
challenge. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. "The second step of this process does not demand an
explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 767-68. Instead, the issue
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in step two is simply one of "facial validity." Id. at 768 (quotations and citation omitted); accord
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d at 548. "Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's
explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768.
(quotations and citation omitted).
In this case, the State offered two race neutral justifications for the strike: first, that Curry
was deaf in his right ear, and second, that Curry was too young. R. 214: 17. There is no
inherently discriminatory intent in either explanation, so the State satisfied its burden under step
two.
In response, Defendant claims that neither explanation was "legitimate" for purposes of
step two because the State did not show that Curry's age or hearing would have actually
impaired his ability to serve as a juror. Aplt. Br. 32-33. In so arguing, however, Defendant
"err[s] by combining Batsotfs second and third steps into one, requiring that the justification
tendered at the second step be not just neutral, but also at least minimally persuasive." Purkett,
514 U.S. at 768; see also Rosa-Re II, 2008 UT App 472, ]f 8. Contrary to Defendant's claim, it "is
not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant." Id.
Although Batson did hold that the government must put forward a "legitimate reason" for
exercising the challenge, subsequent cases clarified that a "legitimate reason" does not have to
actually "make[ ] sense," but instead simply must be one that "does not violate equal
protection." Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Where a proffered explanation is not "peculiar to any
race," it qualifies as a "legitimate reason" that satisfies step two. Id. at 769.
In this case, neither of the two explanations were "peculiar to any race." Id. To the
contrary, deafness and age are both endemic to all races. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court
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has specifically held that peremptory challenges based on a "juror's inability to hear or
understand the proceedings," are facially valid for purposes of step two of the Batson analysis.
State p. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, \ 19, 994 P.2d 177. And though not yet addressed in Utah, other
jurisdictions have consistently permitted prosecutors to base peremptory challenges on a juror's
age or life experience. United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750,754 (10th Cir. 2007); United States
v. Thompson, 450 F.3d 840, 842-43 (8th Cir. 2006); Lockettv. Anderson, 230 F.3d 695,707-08 (5th
Cir. 2000); Howard v. Moore, 131 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Hughes, 970 F.2d
227, 231-32 (7th Cir. 1992).
Thus, the State satisfied its obligation under step two by pointing to two different raceneutral reasons for the peremptory strike.
Step Three: "At the third step of the Batson analysis," the trial court "decide[s] the
ultimate question of whether the defendant has proved that the prosecutor's strike was, in fact,
motivated" by race. Rosa-Re II, 2008 UT App 472, ^f 9 (quotations and citation omitted). At this
step, the question is "not whether the prosecutor's explanation for the strike was factually
correct, but whether it was a pretext to disguise a racial motive." State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153,
156 (Utah App. 1997). "On appeal, a trial court's ruling on the issue of discriminatory intent [in
step three] must be sustained unless it is clearly erroneous." Rosa-Re II, 2008 UT App 472, ^f 3
(quotations and citation omitted); see also State v. Cannon, 2002 UT App 18, \ 5, 41 P.3d 1153.
The reason for this is that such findings "largely will turn on evaluation of credibility." Id.
In this case, the prosecutor offered two different explanations for the peremptory strike,
both of which were race-neutral and "related to the case being tried." State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d
517, 518 (Utah 1989). First, the prosecutor explained that Curry was "deaf in his right ear." R.
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214: 17. This is a legitimate concern for purposes of jury selection. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^f 19.
Other courts that have examined Batson challenges that were based on physical disabilities have
reached similar results. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 831-35 (D.C. Cir. 2007);
United States v. Hams, 197 F.3d 870, 875 (7th Cir. 1999); Bang v. State, 620 So.2d 106,107-09 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993); Jones v. State, 548 S.E.2d 75, 76-77 (Ga. App. 2001). Thus, "[w]hile it is
impermissible to exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of race or gender, no such
prohibition applies to physical disabilities." People v. Falkenstein, 288 A.D.2d 922,922 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001).
Moreover, the prosecutor had a particular reason for being concerned about the potential
impact of Curry's hearing loss on this jury. As part of its case, the State used a map of the
apartment complex as one of its exhibits at trial. See State's Exhibit 27. As the various witnesses
testified, the State asked them to step away from the witness stand and answer questions while
marking transparencies that had been put on top of the map. R. 214: 40-46, 68-70, 85-87; R.
215: 23-25, 32-35,129-44,156-62. This took the witnesses away from the witness box, which
would have naturally raised a concern that some of the testimony would be difficult to hear. In
at least one instance at trial, this concern was expressed on the record. R. 215: 35 ("Come sit
down because it's a little harder to hear you when you are up there.").
Although Defendant correcdy notes that the prosecutor did not specifically question
Curry about his hearing loss, "the prosecutor's failure to voir dire [Curry] does not make his
facially valid explanation for dismissing [him] pretextual as a matter of law." Bowman, 945 P.2d
at 156. Given these circumstances, the trial court did not clearly err when it found that the
prosecutor struck Curry because of Curry's hearing loss, rather than because of racial animus.
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Second, the prosecutor also legitimately struck Curry based on his age.6 Like disability,
age is a "race-neutral justification for exercising a peremptory strike," and every "circuit to
address the issue has rejected the argument that jury-selection procedures discriminating on the
basis of age violate equal protection." United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir.
2007).

In Thompson, 450 F.3d at 842-43, for example, the Eighth Circuit accepted the

government's claim that a prospective juror who had "no children," was "not employed," and
was "not married" was stricken because he "has not had many of life's experiences." In Lockett,
230 F.3d at 707, the Fifth Circuit accepted a similar claim that a "young, twenty-two year[] old"
juror who was "not married" might be "less stable than some of these other jurors."
In this case, Curry was a high school graduate with no spouse and no children, and the
only magazine he subscribed to was Car and Driver R. 243: 33.

Although Defendant now

points to five other potential jurors who were also young, Aplt. Br. 33 n.4, "none of the [m] had
all of these factors in combination." Hughes, 970 F.2d at 231. Unlike Curry, Gregory Mortenson
had almost completed college, was engaged, and read several different magazines. R. 243: 16.
Unlike Curry, Betty Kurilich was married and had a 17 month-old child. R. 243: 17. Unlike
Curry, Clinton Fowler was married and had completed "some college." R. 243: 23. And unlike
Curry, Zachary Davis was in his first year of college. R. 243: 31.
The closest comparison to Curry from the venire was Timothy Baker. Like Curry, Baker
was also a high school graduate with no spouse or children. R. 243: 32. Unlike Curry, however,

While the juror questionnaire would have presumably included Curry's exact age, that
questionnaire was not included as part of the appellate record.
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Baker indicated that he reads Time magazine, which at least conveys a broader range of interests
than Curry. Id.
In any event, the "ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation" rests with
Defendant Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. And while a court may consider whether a proffered
reason was equally applicable to a non-minority juror, see, e.g., State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401, 40405 (Utah App. 1996), that fact alone is not dispositive. Instead, it is but one of five different
factors that the courts use "as guidelines to determine the legitimacy of a purportedly raceneutral explanation," and which are simply intended to "focus [] the court's evaluation on" the
question of whether the strike was really "an impermissible pretext for discrimination." State v.
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454, 464 (Utah App. 1993). Thus, a defendant does not ultimately prevail by
locating some comparable white juror who was not stricken. Rather, the defendant must still
persuade the court that the "prosecutor's strike was, in fact, motivated" by race. Rosa-Re II,
2008 UT App 472, H 9.
Here, Defendant's Batson challenge ultimately fails because Defendant has not shown
that the prosecutor was actually motivated by racial animus. Instead, the trial court made a
credibility determination that the prosecutor was not motivated by racial animus when she
struck Curry, and Defendant has pointed to nothing in the record that disputes this.
Moreover, the trial court's finding is also supported by the fact that there is no proof that
Curry was even a racial minority. In pursuing a Batson claim, a defendant "has the burden of
making an adequate record" of the challenged juror's ethnicity. Bowman, 945 P.2d at 156. When
defense counsel first raised the objection in this case, however, he stated that he could not even
"hazard to guess as to Mr. Curry's racial background." R. 214: 16. But rather than conducting
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additional questioning to determine Curry's ethnicity, defense counsel instead objected based on
his opinion that Curry "appear[ed] to be the only racial minority on the jury panel." R. 214: 16.
In Rosa-Re II, this Court recendy explained that even where the step one analysis is
mooted, it is appropriate "in step three to consider the totality of the relevant facts, including
the strength or weakness of the prima facie case, in determining whether the opponent of a
peremptory strike has carried his burden to prove intentional discrimination." Rosa-Rj? II, 2008
UT App 472, f 5. Here, Defendant's claim of racial discrimination is weakened by his "failjure]
to establish [Curry's] ethnicity conclusively on the record." Bowman, 945 P.2d at 156.
In short, the record in this case shows nothing more than that the prosecutor struck a
young, inexperienced, hearing-impaired juror from the venire panel, and it contains litde
evidence of the juror's race, let alone of the prosecutor's purported racial animus. In these
circumstances, Defendant has not shown that the trial court clearly erred when it concluded that
this peremptory strike was not an act of purposeful discrimination. If addressed on its merits,
this Court should affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's Batson challenge.
IV.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT ADMITTED PHOTOGRAPHS OF CAMERON'S WOUNDS
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted three
non-gruesome photos of Cameron's wounds at trial. Aplt. Br. 36-39. Defendant's argument
should be rejected.
A. These photographs did not violate rule 403.
Under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, otherwise relevant evidence "may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
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the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
Although a moving party ordinarily bears the burden of persuasion, Utah courts have
recognized that "some categories of evidence, including gruesome photographs/' are considered
"inherently prejudicial." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 87, \ 34, 57 P.3d 220 (quotations and citation
omitted). As such, when the State seeks to admit a bloody photograph into evidence, the court
must first determine whether the photo "meets the legal definition of gruesomeness." State v.
Bluff, 2002 UT 66, \ 45, 52 P.3d 1210. If the photo is legally gruesome, the burden shifts to the
State to "show that the probative value of such evidence substantially outweighs the risk of
unfair prejudice." Id. But if the court instead determines that the photo is not gruesome, "it
should be admitted unless the defendant can show that the risk of unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the photograph" under rule 403. Id. at ^j 46.
When Defendant raised this issue below, the trial court concluded that: (1) the challenged
photographs were not gruesome, and (2) the photographs were admissible under rule 403. R.
214: 14-15. On appeal, Defendant does not specifically challenge that trial court's conclusion
that the photos were not gruesome, nor does he ever argue that the State should bear the
burden of showing that the probative value substantially outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice.
Aplt. Br. 2, 36-39. Given this, the only question before this Court is whether the trial court
abused its discretion when it admitted these photos under rule 403. See Bluff, 2002 UT 66y ^j 47.
In assessing a trial court's ruling that evidence was admissible under rule 403, the court
presumes that the evidence was admissible. State v. DiBello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1229 (Utah 1989).
Here, Defendant argues that the photographs should have been excluded because: (1) they had
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limited probative value, and (2) created a danger of unfair prejudice. Aplt. Br. 37-38. Defendant
is incorrect on both fronts.
First, these photographs had clear probative value. In order to prove the charge of
attempted aggravated murder regarding Cameron Hardman, the State had to show that
Defendant attacked Cameron with knife, intending to kill him. See generally Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-202 (West 2004).
These three pictures were directly probative of that allegation. As explained at trial,
Exhibit 1 showed the knife wound that Cameron suffered when Defendant stabbed him in the
right arm; Exhibit 2 showed the knife wound that Cameron suffered when he tried grabbing the
knife away from Defendant; and Exhibit 4 showed the knife wound that Cameron suffered
when Defendant stabbed him in the back while Cameron was running away. R. 214: 30-32.
Defense counsel explicitly recognized the evidentiary value of these photographs below,
informing the court that he was "willing to admit and stipulate, in fact, that these particular
wounds are relevant to the charge in this particular case, and that is the allegation of attempted
homicide . . . through use of a knife." R. 214: 12-13.
In addition to establishing the fact of the assault, these photographs were also relevant to
rebut Defendant's self-defense claim. Specifically, while Defendant admitted that he stabbed
Cameron, he claimed that he only did so as a means of fending Cameron off. R. 216: 63. In
reviewing similar claims, however, other courts have held that the government can use
photographs of the victim's wounds to rebut a defendant's claim that he stabbed the victim in
self-defense. The Oregon Court of Appeals, for example, has held that photos of knife wounds
can rebut a claim of self-defense, in part, by showing the "force of the knife thrusts." State v.
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Middleton, 611 P.2d 698, 701-02 (Or. App. 1980). The Mississippi Court of Appeals likewise
admitted photos which showed the "severity" of the victim's wounds, holding that they made
the defendant's self-defense claim "less probable in the eyes of the jury." Dean v. State, 746
So.2d 891, 893-94 (Miss. App. 1998). Other courts have reached similar results. See Nobles v.
State, 411 S.E.2d 294,301 (Ga. App. 1991); People v. Fierer, 529 N.E. 2d 972, 979 (111. 1988); State
v. Cottrell, 910 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Mo. App. E.D. 1995); cf Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144,
1149 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).
In this case, Defendant claimed that he only stabbed Cameron in order to fend him off.
R. 216: 63. If Defendant had simply been trying to fend Cameron off, however, one could
reasonably expect Cameron to have only suffered shallow or surface level wounds, rather than
die deep, jagged gashes that are shown in Exhibits 1, 2, and 4. Given this, these photographs
were relevant insofar as they "enabled the jury to see how the physical evidence and
circumstances of the stabbing compared to [defendant's] version of the facts." Troncoso v. State,
2004 WL 573659 at * 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (unpublished).
Second, Defendant is incorrect when he claims that the bloody nature of these
photographs created a danger of unfair prejudice. In State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah
1989), the supreme court noted that "all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being
damaging to the party against whom it is offered." Given this, "prejudice which calls for
exclusion is given a more specialized meaning: an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, such as bias, sympathy, hatred,
contempt, retribution, or horror." Id. (quotations and citation omitted). Evidence is therefore
deemed to be directed at an "improper basis" when it has an undue tendency to "cause the jury
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to base its decision on something other than the established propositions of the case." State v.
Undgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996) (quotations and citation omitted).
In this case, proof of Cameron's wounds was not outside the "established propositions
of the case." Id. To the contrary, these wounds were the very basis for one of the charges
against Defendant. Thus, any prejudice suffered by Defendant was not "unfair," but was
instead the natural result of the charges at issue.
The fact that these photographs were bloody did not change this. To the contrary, Utah
courts have repeatedly allowed the State to introduce bloody photographs when relevant to one
of the elements of the crime. In State v. Betha, 957 P.2d 611, 614-16 (Utah App. 1998), for
example, the State was permitted to introduce two exhibits that were both "bloody" and
"graphic," due to the fact that the exhibits were "essential in helping the jury resolve" the
questions at issue in the case. In State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5,fflj50-57,20 P.3d 271, the State was
similarly allowed to introduce two color photographs that were taken during a homicide victim's
autopsy. The supreme court explained that the photographs "demarcated] the types of injuries"
the victim received, and also "explained] how at least some of [the victim's] injuries could have
resulted from repeated blows" by the murder weapon that had been linked to the Defendant
Id at ffij 56-57.
In response, Defendant argues that these photographs were unduly prejudicial because
he "did not dispute that he stabbed" Cameron. Aplt. Br. 37. But this concession does not alter
the rule 403 analysis. To the contrary, the supreme court has held that a "stipulation of fact by
defense counsel does not make evidence less relevant, nor is it a basis for depriving the
prosecution the opportunity of profiting from the legitimate moral force of its evidence." State
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v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, % 37,106 P.3d 734 (quotations and citation omitted). Put differently, a
"stipulation is a voluntary agreement between the parties, not a unilateral decision of one party
forced upon another." State v. Flore^ 111 P.2d 452, 455 (Utah 1989) (quotations and citation
omitted). The State therefore had "the right to present to the jury a picture of the events relied
upon." Id. (quotations and citation omitted).
Defendant is also incorrect when he argues that the photographs were unduly prejudicial
because the State could establish the existence of these injuries through other sources. Aplt 38.
"Despite [defendant's] arguments to the contrary, bloody clothing and photographs of the
victim are not excluded under rule 403 simply because the State could have established the same
facts through other evidence." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^j 54, 993 P.2d 837; accord Gulbransen,
2005 UT 7, Tf 38 ("We have held that the fact that the same evidence could have been provided
by purely testimonial means does not necessarily make a photograph inadmissible." (quotations
and citation omitted)).
Finally, Defendant is also incorrect when he suggests that the presence of tubing and
bandages rendered these photographs inadmissible. Aplt. Br. 38-39. In State v. Barber, 2009 UT
App 91, \ 63, — P.3d --, this Court recently noted that such items "are commonly seen on
hospital patients and therefore are less likely to inflame a jury." While many of the prior cases
have involved photographs in which the wounds were cleaned prior to the photograph being
taken, the courts in such cases have not treated the presence of blood (or lack thereof) as a
controlling factor, but instead have viewed it alongside the other factors in conducting the 403
balancing. See, e.g., Vargas, 2001 UT 5,ffi[50-57; Betha, 957 P.2d at 614-16.
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In this case, the State was required to prove that Defendant intended to kill Cameron
Hardman with a knife when he assaulted him. In proving that case, the State introduced
photographs taken shortly after the attack occurred. The fact that there was blood on the
photographs did not render them inadmissible.
B. Even if these photographs violated rule 403, the error was harmless.
In any event, even if the trial court did abuse its discretion, the error was harmless. It is
well established that harmless error review is available when a trial court erroneously admits
bloody photographs. See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 87, \ 36; Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1230. In such
cases, the result is only reversed where there is a "reasonable likelihood" that, absent the
photographs, "the result would have been more favorable to the defendant." Dibello, 780 P.2d
at 1230. "This 'reasonable likelihood' standard is met if [the court's] confidence in the outcome
is undermined." Id.
In this case, a number of witnesses testified that Defendant was seen stalking Kathy
Capellan prior to this attack. R. 215: 65-66, 154-55. Kathy and Cameron then gave detailed
testimony regarding the attack itself, during which both implicated Defendant as the aggressor,
R. 215: 27-28, 31-34, and a number of other witnesses then testified that they saw Defendant
chase Cameron through a parking lot, stab him in the back, stab his dog in the throat, and then
try dragging Kathy to a car while threatening to kill her. R. 214: 43-46, 89; R. 215: 159-61.
Given this, it is highly unlikely that the jury convicted Defendant because there was blood in
these three photographs. Rather, this conviction was the result of the collective testimony
offered by a wide array of witnesses.
The error, if any, was harmless.
43

V.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY
REOPENING THE CASE TO ALLOW T H E STATE TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
Defendant argues that the State should not have been allowed to reopen its case to
provide additional evidence following the conclusion of the trial on the aggravator. Aplt Br. 3946. Defendant's argument should be rejected.
The State was required to prove that Defendant had a prior murder conviction in order
to support the aggravated charge. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202(1) (West 2004). Utah courts have
long allowed the State to prove the existence of a prior conviction by submitting documents
establishing that a person with the same name had been convicted of the stated crime. See State
v. Hams, 264 P.2d 284, 284-86 (Utah 1953); State v. Bruno, 256 P. 109,109-11 (Utah 1927). In
State v. Anderson, 191 P.2d 1114 (Utah App. 1990), this Court held that such documents are
sufficient as long as they are "written, clear and definite, and signed by the court." Other courts
have reached similar results. See, e.g., State P. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146, 146-49 (Utah 1989)
(affirming an enhancement based solely on documentation); State v. Hemande^ 2008 UT App
342U, **2-3 (unpublished) (same); State v. Pirela, 2003 UT App 39,ffij27-30,65 P.3d 307 (same);
State v. Cravens, 1999 UT App 156U, **l-2 (unpublished) (same).
In this case, the State submitted documents showing that Henry Jackson had been
convicted of second degree murder in 1982, R. 207: 3, thus satisfying its burden. In response,
Defendant did not argue that these documents were insufficient to prove his identity. R. 207:46. Instead, Defendant only argued that he had actually been convicted of manslaughter, not
murder. R. 207: 4-6. It was not until Defendant filed his post-trial motion that he first argued
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that he was not the Henry Jackson from the prior case, thus leading to the State's motion to
reopen the case.
In Utah, a "motion to reopen a case . . . is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court." Tuftv. Brotherson, 150 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1944). In "the absence of a showing that such
discretion was abused, the ruling of the court should not be disturbed." Id.; see also Lewis v.
Porter, 556P.2d496,497 (Utah 197 6); A.K&K

Whipple Plumbing& Heating v. Aspen Constr., 1999

UT App 87, \ 23, 977 P.2d 518. When reviewing a discretionary decision, an appellate court
does not "substitute its reasoning for that of the trial court," nor does it "determine whether it
would have made a like decision." 5 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 906. Instead, the court only
abuses its discretion where the "decision [is] beyond the limits of reasonability," such that "no
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." State v. Montiel, 2005 UT 48,
Tf 24, 122 P.3d 571 (quotations and citation omitted).
When a trial court considers a motion to reopen a case, the court considers "all the
circumstances" and "grant[s] or den[ies] it in the interest of fairness and substantial justice."
Lewis, 556 P.2d at 497. This authority to reopen a case clearly extends to criminal prosecutions.
In State v. Lawrence, 234 P.2d 600,601 (Utah 1951), for example, the supreme court considered a
case in which the prosecution failed to present evidence regarding one of the elements of the
crime during its case-in-chief. When the defendant filed a motion for a directed verdict, the
prosecution asked the court to simply take judicial notice of the omitted fact. Id. Although the
supreme court ultimately rejected the State's judicial notice claim, the supreme court
nevertheless suggested that the prosecution should have moved to reopen the case. Id. The
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court explained that in such circumstances, the "State's attorney might properly and with little
difficulty have moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence." Id. (emphasis added).
Here, Defendant's post-trial motion raised a new defense that contradicted the position
he had previously taken during the proceedings. During arguments on his pretrial motion to
bifurcate, for example, defense counsel had stated that the aggravated offenses were "based on a
prior conviction Mr. Jackson was previously convicted of in a homicide in the early eighties." R.
139: 5. On the third day of trial, defense counsel specifically proffered that Defendant's prior
conviction "involve[d] his spouse, and she was killed, I believe, with a gun." R. 216:10. While
Defendant did not personally "recall all of the details of what happened," defense counsel
acknowledged that "it was a homicide by gun 20, 25 years ago." R. 216: 10.
Although Defendant now claims that these statements did not qualify as a formal
admission, Aplt Br. 41, the issue is not one of formality. Rather, the issue is one of "fairness"
and "justice." Lewis, 556 P.2d at 497; see also Davis v. Riley, 437 P.2d 453, 455 (Utah 1968)
(holding that a trial court's power to reopen a case "servfes] the always desired objective of
doing justice" and avoiding "inequitable or unjust result[s]"). And in this case, defense counsel
repeatedly acknowledged that Defendant had previously been convicted, going so far as to
preemptively request a ruling from the trial court mid-trial regarding the admissibility of that
very conviction. R. 216: 7-10. Given this, the trial court was well within its discretion when it
concluded that these statements had mislead the prosecution about defendant's position,
thereby justifying a decision to allow the State to provide rebuttal evidence when Defendant first
raised the claim in his post-trial brief.
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In short, the "justice system is not a sporting event in which each side has a right to
exploit every tactical advantage available." Medel v. State6 2008 UT 32, % 54, 184 P.3d 1226.
Instead, the "Very nature of a trial is a search for truth,'" Mathem v. United States, 485 U.S. 58,72
(1988) (citation omitted), and its results should not be '"determined by strategies appropriate to
determining the outcome of a game.'" State v. Montqya, 910 P.2d 441, 446 (Utah App. 1996).
The purpose of these proceedings was to determine whether Defendant actually had a
prior conviction for murder. When Defendant raised a new defense after the close of evidence,
the State "properly . . . moved to reopen and supply the missing evidence" before the court
rendered its decision. Lawrence, 234 P.2d at 601. In these circumstances, there was no abuse of
discretion.
VI.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ERR W H E N IT DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR DESTRUCTION OF
EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the case
based on the State's failure to produce the vehicle that Defendant was driving at the time of the
attack. Aplt. Br. 46-48. This claim should be rejected.
Under Rule 16(a)(4), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the State has the obligation to
"disclose to the defense upon request" any evidence that is "known to the prosecutor that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the Defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment."

In State v. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49,% 41,162 P.3d 1106,

the Utah Supreme Court identified several "nonexclusive factors" that "guide a trial court's
decision" on a motion to dismiss charges for destruction of evidence. These factors include:
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(1) the extent to which the prosecution's representation [of the existing evidence]
is actually inaccurate, (2) the tendency of the omission or misstatement to lead
defense counsel into tactics or strategy that could prejudice the outcome, (3) the
culpability of the prosecutor in omitting pertinent information or misstating the
facts, and (4) the extent to which appropriate defense investigation would have
discovered the omitted or misstated evidence.
Id.
In this case, Defendant points to no "inaccura[cy]" or "misstatement" in any of the
State's discovery responses, nor does Defendant argue that the State "omittfed] pertinent
information or misstate [ed] the facts." Id. Defendant does not allege, for example, that the
prosecutor ever misled him about the vehicle's whereabouts, nor does he allege that the
prosecutor ever lied about the blood evidence that was collected. See generally Aplt. Br. 46-48.
Instead, Defendant's only complaint is that the State failed to produce the vehicle upon request.
But there is little to suggest that the vehicle's potential exculpatory value was "known to
the prosecutor" at any time before it was released to its lienholder. Utah R. Crim. P. 16(a)(4).
Although the attack occurred on November 9,2006, and although Defendant was clearly aware
of the vehicle's existence, Defendant made no mention of the vehicle in his November 27,2006,
discovery request. R. 11-13. Instead, Defendant first mentioned the vehicle in his September 7,
2007, motion to dismiss, R. 87, filed almost a year after the attack. By that point, however, the
State had already released it to its lienholder, who had already sold it. R. 139: 3.
While Defendant now argues that the vehicle might have had probative value because it
would have allowed him to test the blood stains, Aplt. Br. 46-48, the first time that Defendant
ever mentioned blood testing on the vehicle was on September 25, 2007, when he filed a
discovery request asking for a "copy of any and all reports regarding any blood tests conducted
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on [Defendant's vehicle or clothing." R. 109-10. In response, the State informed Defendant
that it had not conducted any blood testing on the vehicle, R. 113-14, and Detective Winters
later explained that this was because the State saw no apparent need to do so. R. 215: 188.
Although the State subsequently offered to let defendant conduct his own testing on the blood
samples that had been taken from the vehicle before it was released, R. 139: 5, the record
contains no indication that defense counsel ever took the State up on this offer.
But even if the State should have independently anticipated that Defendant might
eventually seek access to the car, this still does not mean that the State should have been
sanctioned for its failure to preserve the vehicle. Under Tiedemann, a motion for discovery
sanctions also considers whether an "appropriate defense investigation would have discovered
the omitted or misstated evidence." Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^ 41. And in this case, "discovery"
of the vehicle was never an issue. Defendant has never disputed that he drove the vehicle on
November 9; thus, there is no question that he knew that it existed. Given this, if Defendant
had truly believed that this was "important evidence" that would create a "reasonable
probability" of acquittal, Aplt. Br. 47-48, an "appropriate defense investigation" would have
included a timely request that the State secure the vehicle for testing. As discussed above,
however, Defendant did not make such a request until September 2007, by which time the
vehicle had already been released to its lienholder.
Thus, this is not a case in which the State hid any evidence or made any "omissionfs] or
misstatement^]" to defense counsel. Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, \ 41. Instead, this was a case in
which Defendant knew about the vehicle's existence all along, knew that there would have been
blood in it, presumably knew that he would be arguing self-defense, but still did not mention the
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vehicle to the State until almost a year after the attack. In these circumstances, the trial court did
not err when it refused to hold that the State was culpable for having released the vehicle to the
lienholder.
In any event, even if Defendant had shown that the prosecution failed to turn over
evidence with known exculpatory value, Defendant was still not entitled to relief unless there
was a "reasonable probability that lost or destroyed evidence would be exculpatory." Id. at If 44.
In making this assessment, the court examines the "degree of prejudice to the defendant in light
of the materiality and importance of the missing evidence in the context of the case as a whole,
including the strength of the remaining evidence." Id. Here, Defendant has not shown that
there is any reasonable probability that the car would have contained any exculpatory evidence.
During his closing argument at trial, defense counsel offered his first detailed explanation
regarding the potential exculpatory value of the bloodstains. Defense counsel argued that
Cameron had been the aggressor in the incident, not Defendant. R. 216: 64. Defense counsel
specifically claimed Cameron had brought his dog with him as he attacked Defendant, and that
Defendant had stabbed the dog while the dog was attacking him in the car. R. 216: 64-68.
Defense counsel accordingly suggested that if there had been dog's blood in the car, this would
have supported his self-defense claim. R. 216: 64-68.
The central problem with this theory is that it was pure speculation.

Defendant

introduced no evidence at trial that supported this version of the events, nor did he elicit any
testimony from any witness that showed that Cameron had initiated the confrontation by
approaching him with the dog. By contrast, Kathy and Cameron both testified without
contradiction that Cameron approached the car without the dog, and that he had done so only
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after Defendant had hit Kathy with the car. R. 215: 29-34,75-76. In addition, Kathy, Cameron,
and Tifany Herrera all testified without contradiction that they saw Defendant stab the dog after
Cameron had begun backing away from the car, not before. R. 215: 34, 76, 160.
In any event, even if the blood stains in the car had been tested, and even if this testing
had shown that there was dog's blood in the car, this still would not have supported
Defendant's story with respect to either attempted aggravated murder charge.
First, the charge relating to Kathy stemmed from Kathy's claim that Defendant ran over
her with his car. While Defendant now claims that he never did this, Kathy and Cameron both
specifically testified otherwise. R. 215: 27-28, 73. And while no other witness actually saw this
initial attack, several of the neighbors did hear a loud crash that sounded like a car had hit
something. R. 214: 41, 89; 215: 156. Defendant offered no evidence or testimony that would
have explained what else this crash would have been.
In addition, Defendant's behavior after the attack on Cameron showed that he was the
aggressor during this entire incident Specifically, multiple witnesses saw Defendant approach
Kathy while she was laying on the ground, make throat-slitting gestures toward her, threaten to
kill her, and try dragging her back to his car. R. 214: 46; 215: 77, 86,161. This, too, belied his
claim that he was the unwitting victim of Kathy's attack on him.
But even if there had been dog's blood in the car, this still would not have disproved
Kathy's claim. Specifically, there is no question that when Defendant stabbed the dog in the
neck, he created a very bloody wound. For example, Tifany Herrera testified that when
Defendant stabbed the dog, the dog ended up "squirting blood" on a nearby car. R. 215: 166.
When Pamela Lomax approached the dog after Defendant had left, "the dog was bleeding
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profusely out of his neck." R. 214: 48. An animal control officer later testified that the dog had
a "stab wound about an inch in length" that was "continually bleeding." R. 215: 106-07.
Given this, the presence of dog's blood within the car would not have impacted the
State's theory regarding the attack on Kathy at all. To the contrary, this would have simply
suggested that Defendant had gotten the dog's blood on him when he stabbed the dog in the
throat, and that the blood had then rubbed off in the car as Defendant drove away. This would
not have created a reasonable probability of acquittal with respect to this charge.
Second, this evidence would also have been unavailing with respect to Defendant's attack
on Cameron. The charges relating to Cameron stemmed from the fact that Defendant stabbed
him four times with a large knife. Even if Cameron had initially been the aggressor, however,
Defendant still would have been convicted of attempted aggravated murder based on his
conduct after Cameron backed away from the car.
Specifically, contrary to Defendant's theory, his right to self-defense did not allow him to
aggressively pursue Cameron with a knife once Cameron had fled. Under Utah Code Annotated
§ 76-2-402 (West 2004), Defendant was only justified in using lethal force against Cameron "to
the extent that [Defendant] reasonably believe[d] that force [was] necessary to defend himself
. . . against [Cameron's] imminent use of unlawful force." Regardless of whether Cameron was
initially the aggressor, Utah law therefore did not allow Defendant to attack Cameron after
Cameron had retreated.
Here, however, multiple witnesses saw Defendant get out of his car, chase Cameron
through a parking lot, and stab him in the back. R. 214: 43-45; 215: 158-59. This could not be
self-defense under Utah law. Thus, the presence of dog's blood in the car would not have
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created a reasonable probability that Defendant would have been acquitted of trying to kill
Cameron.
In short, the "touchstone" for rule 16(a)(4) balancing is "fundamental fairness."
Tiedemann, 2007 UT 49, ^f 45. As in Tiedemann, Defendant "has not shown any degree of
culpability or bad faith on the part of the State, and the reasons for the loss of the evidence" in
this case "are entirely routine and benign." Id. at \ 46. But even if the State did violate its
obligations, Defendant's claim still fails because there is no reasonable probability that this
evidence would have led to a different result. As such, the trial court did not err when it denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss.
VII.
T H E TRIAL COURT DID N O T ABUSE ITS DISCRETION W H E N
IT ORDERED D E F E N D A N T TO SERVE CONSECUTIVE
SENTENCES
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to
serve consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences. Aplt Br. 49-50.
Under Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004), a trial court is required to
consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant" when deciding whether to order
consecutive or concurrent sentences. It is well established that a trial court does not need to
"'state to what extent it considered each of the statutory factors at the sentencing hearing.5"
State v. Valde^ 2008 UT App 329, If 8,194 P.3d 195 (citation omitted). Instead, the trial court's
decision will be affirmed if the record "contains evidence to suggest that the trial court did
consider all of the factors." State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, \ 13, 40 P.3d 626.
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In this case, the same judge presided at Defendant's trial on the underlying crimes, the
trial on the aggravator, and at sentencing. As a result of presiding over the trial, the trial judge
was clearly aware of the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, as well as the number of
victims. And as a result of presiding over the trial on the aggravator, this same judge was also
aware of Defendant's criminal history, a critical component of Defendant's "history, character,
and rehabilitative needs." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2).
Moreover, the trial court received a PSI prior to sentencing Defendant. R. 241. The PSI
specifically discussed the nature of this offense, Defendant's criminal history, and Defendant's
rehabilitative needs. R. 241. "[Tjhere has been no contention that the trial court did not review
the pre-sentence report, and the record supports the court's review of the report" Valde^ 2008
UT App 329, \ 8.
In short, given the violent nature of Defendant's crime, the number of victims involved,
and the fact that this was not Defendant's first attempt to kill a spouse or girlfriend, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Defendant to serve consecutive sentences.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted July Z2~-% 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

RYAtfu. TENNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Page 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
* ! Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*! Article IV. Relevancy and Its Limits
.+ RULE 403. EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON GROUNDS OF PREJUDICE,
CONFUSION, OR WASTE OF TIME
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

Current with amendments effective July 1, 2009.
Copr (c) 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No claim to orig. U.S. govt.
END OF DOCUMENT
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*S Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*H Article VIII. Hearsay
-• RULE 801. DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply under this article:

(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior Statement by Witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony
and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or (C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or
(2) Admission by Party-Opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement
concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope
of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
CREDIT(S)
[Amended effective October 1, 1992.]
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Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
*S Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*S Article VIII. Hearsay
-• RULE 803. HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS; AVAILABILITY OF DECLARANT IMMATERIAL
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter.
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under
the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
(3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state
of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and
bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of declarant's will.
(4) Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis
or treatment.
(5) Recorded recollection. A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a witness once had
knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to
have been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in the witness' memory and to reflect that
knowledge correctly. If admitted, the memorandum or record may be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse party.
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form,
of acts, events, conditions, opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the
regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, or by certification that complies with Rule
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902(11), Rule 902(12), or a statute permitting certification, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6). Evidence that a
matter is not included in the memoranda, reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was
of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty
imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
(9) Records of vital statistics. Records or data compilations, in any form, of births, fetal deaths, deaths, or marriages, if the report thereof was made to a public office pursuant to requirements of law.
(10) Absence of public record or entry. To prove the absence of a record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, or the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of a matter of which a record, report, statement, or data
compilation in any form, was regularly made and preserved by a public office or agency, evidence in the form of
a certification in accordance with Rule 902, or testimony, that diligent search failed to disclose the record, report, statement, or data compilation, or entry.
(11) Records of religious organization. Statements of births, marriages, divorces, deaths, legitimacy, ancestry,
relationship by blood or marriage, or other similar facts of personal or family history, contained in a regularly
kept record of a religious organization.
(12) Marriage, baptismal, and similar certificates. Statements of fact contained in a certificate that the maker
performed a marriage or other ceremony or administered a sacrament, made by a clergyman, public official, or
other person authorized by the rules or practices of a religious organization or by law to perform the act certified, and purporting to have been issued at the time of the act or within a reasonable time thereafter.
(13) Family records. Statements of fact concerning personal or family history contained in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits, engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones,
or the like.
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(14) Records of documents affecting an interest in property. The record of a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property, as proof of the content of the original recorded document and its execution
and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed, if the record is a record of a public office and an applicable statute authorizes the recording of documents of that kind in that office.
(15) Statements in documents affecting an interest in property. A statement contained in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document, unless dealings with the property since the document was made have been inconsistent with the truth of
the statement or the purport of the document.
(16) Statements in ancient documents. Statements in a document in existence twenty years or more the authenticity of which is established.
(17) Market reports, commercial publications. Market quotations, tabulations, lists, directories, or other published compilations, generally used and relied upon by the public or by persons in particular occupations.
(18) Learned treatises. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-examination or relied upon by the expert witness in direct examination, statements contained in published treatises, periodicals, or
pamphlets on a subject of history, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by the
testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.
(19) Reputation concerning personal or family history. Reputation among members of a person's family by
blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth,
adoption, marriage, divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other
similar fact of personal or family history.
(20) Reputation concerning boundaries or general history. Reputation in a community arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general
history important to the community or State or nation in which located.
(21) Reputation as to character. Reputation of a person's character among associates or in the community.
(22) Judgment of previous conviction. Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of
guilty (but not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudging a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential to sustain the judgment, but not including, when
offered by the prosecution in a criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against
persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does not affect admissibility.
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(23) Judgment as to personal, family or general history, or boundaries. Judgments as proof of matters of
personal, family or general history, or boundaries, essential to the judgment, if the same would be provable by
evidence of reputation.

CREDIT(S)
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
* ! Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
+ RULE 16. DISCOVERY
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has knowledge:

(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown should be made available to the
defendant in order for the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before
the defendant is required to plead. The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose to the prosecutor such information
as required by statute relating to alibi or insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on
good cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the prosecutor to adequately prepare
his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as
soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and

© 2009 Thomson Reuters/West. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 16

Page 2

places. The prosecutor or defense may impose reasonable limitations on the further dissemination of sensitive
information otherwise subject to discovery to prevent improper use of the information or to protect victims and
witnesses from harassment, abuse, or undue invasion of privacy, including limitations on the further dissemination of videotaped interviews, photographs, or psychological or medical reports.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted,
or deferred, that limitations on the further dissemination of discovery be modified or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make such showing, in whole or in part,
in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed and preserved in the
records of the court to be made available to the appellate court in the event of an appeal,
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it
deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the time of the alleged offense.
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Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of
the time and place of such appearance shall be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to
appear or to comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the court, without reasonable
excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in
chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and shall be subject to such
further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.
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